Norma e azione: verso modelli di razionalità normativa

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Norm and Action: In Search of Models of Normative Rationality

Abstract: von Wright remarked (von Wright, 1983) that his work in deontic logic tries to cope with the problem that norms do not have a truth value. In Norm and Action, two different and partly conflicting strategies are employed to deal with this problem. The strategy that eventually prevails in von Wright’s subsequent works is the appeal to a model of normative rationality. Such a model can be construed more or less strictly; making use of some key notions from the later Wittgenstein, I argue that the logical connection between general norms and specific prescriptions displays variable margins of tolerance for disagreement, as well as a constitutive openness to contextual reasons. This leads to a liberal, or a humanistic, conception of normative rationality.

Keywords: Deontic logic, von Wright, Rationality, Normative rationality, Normative statements, Compatibility, Implication, Resilience to disagreement, Reasons, Rule.

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